

# Cyber Security Device Lifecycle Management

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#### **Regulatory Basis**

Regulation: 10CFR 73.54

Industry Guidance (NRC endorsed): NEI 08-09 Rev. 6 & Addendums 1-4

Station's License Basis Document



#### Defense-In-Depth Requirement

Defense-in-depth protective strategies have been implemented, documented, and are maintained to ensure the capability to detect, delay, respond to, and recover from cyber attacks on CDAs.

-NEI 08-09 Revision 6, Appendix A, Section 4.3



## **Defense-In-Depth Strategy**

- Physical Protection
- Network Protection
- 3. Portable Media / Device Protection
- Individual CDA Protections
- Monitoring and Detection
- Incident Response



## **Defense-In-Depth Strategy**

- Physical Protection
- Network Protection
- 3. Portable Media / Device Protection

4. Individual CDA Protections

- 5. Monitoring and Detection
- 6. Incident Response

Prevent An Attack

Prevent and/or Detect


Detect & recover from an attack




## **Physical Protection**

The 1<sup>st</sup> layer of protection for Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) is to provide physical protection.

Only addressed for CDAs outside the PA.



<sup>\*</sup>Site defined owner controlled area






#### **Network Protection**

The 2<sup>nd</sup> layer of protection for Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) is to isolate/segment network access.

This eliminates the easiest path to attack CDAs – remote attacks that bypass physical security protections




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#### Portable Media / Device Protection

The 3<sup>rd</sup> layer of protection is to control portable media and devices.

This controls the "approved" way for authorized personnel to bypass the network protections




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#### **Individual CDA Protection**

The 4<sup>th</sup> layer of protection is to apply security controls directly to each CDA.

This provides a high degree of protection but presents a significant operational challenge on legacy systems.



#### **Examples**


- Passwords
  - Antivirus
- Individual Accounts
- Logging & Auditing
- Whitelisting

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#### **Monitoring & Detection**

The 5<sup>th</sup> layer of protection is to add centralized network monitoring to identify cyber events across multiple CDAs.

This is a reactive control that minimizes impact by enabling timely detection & response when a cyber event occurs




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#### **Incident Response**

The 6<sup>th</sup> layer of protection is ensure trained personnel are available to respond when a cyber event is detected

This is a reactive control that minimizes impact by ensuring qualified individuals respond to contain & mitigate an event.



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## **Cyber Security Modifications**

Stations performed numerous cyber security modifications to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54.



## **Cyber Security Modifications**

#### These modifications primarily addressed:

- 1. Physical Protection
- 2. Network Protection
- 3. Portable Media / Device Protection
- 4. Individual CDA Protections
- Monitoring and Detection
- 6. Incident Response




# **Future Cyber Security Modifications**

Two issues will drive future Cyber Security modifications

1. Vulnerability Monitoring

2. Cyber Security Device Obsolescence





#### **Vulnerability Monitoring**

Hardware and software vulnerabilities are reported to the federal government and published every day.

We are obligated to screen all of these vulnerabilities to determine what vulnerabilities exist on hardware/software in use at Columbia.

Industry had developed a database that could be used by every utility to simplify this process, but this has been deemed unreliable during the inspection process.



## **Vulnerability Monitoring Process**

1. Obtain the list of weekly vulnerabilities (> 100/week)

2. Screen out any with a severity score of less than 7 for most CDAs

- 3. Determine which vulnerabilities apply to site (hardware or software)
- 4. Review the applicable vulnerabilities CVE 8.9 and document an assessment of whether that vulnerability is adequately addressed by the current security controls



## **Vulnerability Remediation**


Vulnerabilities that are not adequately addressed by our current security controls, require a change to address the vulnerability.

Typically, this will require a software patch.

What method is used to implement the patch

- Complete Engineering Change
- Create a Procedure that can be used

If a cyber event occurs due to an unpatched vulnerability it can escalate the color severity of the finding.






# **Cyber Security Device Obsolescence**

For cyber security, some devices need to be replaced within a normal IT lifecycle. This includes:

- Boundary device (diode, firewall, or network tap)
- 2. Provides central monitoring function that requires vendor support/updates to be current with evolving threats (e.g., SIEM, anti-virus, network switches with intrusion detection, etc.)







## **Cyber Security Device Obsolescence**

#### **Equipment inventory**

- 1. Boundary devices:
- 2. Central monitoring functions:



Typical replacement lifecycle is 6-8 years. Equipment should qualify as like-for-like replacement





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